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Abstract. This article presents a discussion of choice points in secondary and tertiary intervention efforts 
after the discovery that a political entity has been the victim of espionage. 
 
Primary prevention in personnel security and counterintelligence efforts denotes deterring and 
impeding an adversary's espionage and other successful security initiatives--including those initiatives 
conceived and effected by one's own personnel in whom one has placed trust. In this context, secondary 
intervention and tertiary intervention denote efforts to minimize damage and right wrongs after 
primary prevention has been discovered to have failed. Because primary prevention will inevitably fall 
short, expertise in secondary and tertiary intervention is vital. Yet the very nature of secondary and 
tertiary intervention--especially choice points that must be negotiated as to preferred action--affords 
opportunities for others to belittle this nature and even render it as tantamount to scandal. The recent 
journalistic accounts of successful espionage effected by representatives of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) against the United States' (U.S.) Los Alamos National Laboratory constitute a case in point. 
 
The accounts suggest that--largely through the espionage activities of a Chinese-American computer 
scientist working at Los Alamos--PRC weapons developers were able to produce sophisticated, 
miniaturized nuclear warheads that could be launched at multiple targets from a ballistic missile. The 
accounts also suggest that this production was significantly based on the US's most advanced miniature 
nuclear warhead. The inference has been that espionage was responsible for the similarity between the 
Chinese and U.S. warheads and, thus, primary prevention failed. This seems to be a reasonable premise 
with significant supporting data, even if there could possibly be some disconfirming data as well. 
However, the accounts go on to describe US secondary and tertiary intervention efforts as if they were 
woefully inept to the point of scandal. 
 
The accounts suggest that members of the Clinton administration sought to minimize the espionage 
Issue because the Issue "got in the way" of efforts to effect more constructive and cooperative 
economic ties between the US and the PRC. This suggestion certainly can be read as if the Clinton 
administration was willing to sell out the country for a fast buck. However, the Clinton administration, 
rightly or wrongly, has advocated that economic engagement might eventually bring the PRC around on 
other Issues including proliferation of weapons and weapons technology of mass destruction, human 
rights, the rule of law, and even other economic points of contention. Thus, continuation of 
"constructive engagement" even with successful Chinese espionage--especially in the context that 
virtually all political entities attempt to spy on each other--may be suspect in its assumptions about the 
motivations and constraints of Chinese policy behavior, but not immoral and treasonous. This 
continuation is not prima facie proof of an "all costs" predilection--unless by "all costs" one means 
staying the course of a policy--hopefully correct--in the face of pressure to the contrary. To drastically 
change an overall policy just because espionage has been successfully effected would be counter to 
what secondary and tertiary intervention is supposed to engender--greater security for a political entity. 
 
The accounts suggest that the Chinese espionage at Issue was not aggressively pursued, that arrests 
were not made, that the U.S. response to espionage was horribly lax. However, how much of this was 
1
et al.: China, Los Alamos, and Espionage: Scandal Versus Scam
Published by Scholarly Commons, 1999
International Bulletin of Political Psychology  
2 
 
merely prudent secondary and tertiary intervention is left unsaid. Aggressive pursual and arrests are 
direct tip-offs that "the jig is up." If an adversary might believe that its target is still unaware--but that 
target is aware--that target can often begin to minimize damage to itself or even cause some damage 
against its adversary through disinformation, other deception operations, and so on. Moreover, the 
target may best learn about further features of the adversary's intelligence apparatus--both technical 
and human assets. In this case the target would have improved its own personnel security and 
counterintelligence knowledge. 
 
The accounts suggest that investigators were not able to obtain or develop sufficient evidence to 
authorize a wiretap on the suspect--impeding the building of a strong criminal case against the most 
likely espionage suspect. The scandal allegedly is that the evidence should have been obtained 
regardless in the difficulty of obtaining it. No failures, no realities of situations to the contrary. A more 
implicit scandal might be that the scandal of wiretapping without sufficient evidence was not effected. If 
this implicit scandal had been avoided, primary, secondary, and tertiary interventions might have been 
significantly impeded in the long term by severe and freshly legislated constraints. 
 
The accounts suggest that some recommendations to improve security at Los Alamos were not followed 
and that others were only followed after unacceptable lead times. The inference is that the espionage at 
Los Alamos was only an example of an accident ready to happen. However, as with controversies about 
physical security at U.S. embassies throughout the world, the real question is not about unawareness of 
security problems or lack of motivation to resolve these problems. The problem is about money: the 
more money in one's budget goes for security, the less goes for an organization's operational mission. 
Security authorities are forced to prioritize security needs amidst operational, logistics, and many other 
requirements related to an organization's raison d'etre. A related Issue is that a certain degree of 
information flow and sharing as well as of foreign visitors engaged in intellectual cross-fertilization is 
necessary for most successful basic and applied scientific pursuits. Priorities as to openness and security 
must be established as opposed to trying to close off all openness. In fact, excessive secrecy can have its 
own security vulnerabilities. The bottom line is that primary as well as secondary and tertiary 
interventions fail, if they unacceptably delimit a mission even when they succeed. And espionage 
attempts succeed, if they unacceptably delimit a mission even when they fail. 
 
The accounts suggest that Clinton administration senior aides took a skeptical view of the evidence of 
Chinese espionage and its significance as if such a reaction was inherently suspect. In actuality political 
decision-making occurs in a welter of ongoing, seemingly continuous indicators of threat. If all were 
taken seriously and without skepticism, damage to the decision-makers and what they represent would 
surely occur through disinformation and through the shut-down of essential missions and operations. 
Effective secondary and tertiary intervention depend on a judicious appraisal--involving skepticism--of 
the huge number of incoming warnings concerning threat. 
 
The accounts suggest that at least one Executive Branch official was ordered by other such officials not 
to divulge espionage details with members of the U.S. Congress so that Congressional critics of the 
Clinton administration's policies would not have additional "ammunition." Given that there are formal 
procedures to report on even the most sensitive information to at least some Congressional members, 
this suggestion does border on the scandalous. However, effective secondary and tertiary--and even 
primary--interventions are not necessarily compromised if the information in question was sincerely 
judged so suspect by the "other officials" so as not to be of significant security value. In this case the 
decision not to divulge it would appropriately support ongoing U.S. policy towards the PRC. The scandal 
might be in needlessly divulging it. 
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The accounts suggest that a "Team A-Team B" exercise on the data suggesting espionage was 
conducted. As with past U.S. team exercises comprising different groups of people assessing the same 
data to evaluate Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities, a team of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers 
apparently were charged to reassess data previously assessed by representatives of the Department of 
Energy (DOE). Apparently, there was disagreement, with the CIA team taking the position that 
espionage did occur but in a less damaging fashion. There was also disagreement among representatives 
from these two agencies and those of the U.S. National Security Council. However, the disagreement has 
been taken as prima facie evidence of scandal--that two expert organizations can't agree. In another 
context, scandal could equally be ascribed to two expert agencies agree. What's remarkable is that 
accounts have nowhere pointed out that--as with most any complex social phenomenon--even the 
Chinese may not be sure what happened: many, if not all, political actors do not have perfect awareness 
of their own motivations nor perfect perception and attributional processes towards the phenomenon 
of causality. Thus, a significant shortfall in secondary and tertiary intervention is not the only 
interpretation of disagreement. 
 
A scandal that has not yet been mentioned is the typical aftermath of alleged scandal--especially when 
terrorism and/or espionage is at Issue. Panels and committees are activated. Reports are issued. Tomes 
about the alleged scandal abound. Lesson learned disseminated. Organizationally, there is often the 
punishment of the innocent, the transfer of the guilty, and the promotion of the uninvolved. But does a 
more effective mechanism exist to deal with future threat? Rarely. Against the last threat? More often. 
 
A conclusion that might be inferred from all the above--except the last paragraph--is that there is no 
scandal and that intimations of such exemplify a scam. Yes, there may well have been a significant 
security incident--the successful espionage by a Chinese agent or agents. But on a stage on which 
virtually all the players engage in espionage with varying degrees of sophistication at various times, 
successful espionage is inevitable. To wax eloquently and emotionally that "it never should have 
happened" misses the point. In the almost timeless group tango of espionage one might control the 
"who," "where," "when," and "how" but not the "if." (See Albini, J.L., & Anderson, J. (1998). Whatever 
happened to the KGB? International Journal of International and Counterintelligence, 11, 26-56; 
Bowman, M.E. (1995). Prosecuting spies: An uneasy alliance of security, ethics, and law. Defense 
Intelligence Journal, 4, 57-81; Clarke, D.L. (1998). Israel's economic espionage in the United States. 
Journal of Palestine Studies, 27, 20-35; Hulnick, A.S. (1995). The Ames case: HOW could it happen? 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 8, 133-154; Richelson, J.T. (1996). High 
flyin' spies. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 52, 48-54; Risen, J., & Gerth, J. (March 6, 1999). China 
stole nuclear secrets from Los Alamos, U.S. officials say. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; 
Schmitt, E. (March 11, 1999). Albright defends policies on China as G.O.P. attacks. The New York Times, 
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